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ABSTRACT
We used contribution analysis to verify the key assumption in the interven-
tion logic of an innovation fund in Bolivia directed to economic farmer
organisations to develop value-added activities. We focussed the research
on three sub-components of the intervention logic: relevance of the farmer
groups for local economic development, eﬀectiveness of the fund in
strengthening these group, and eﬃciency of the grant allocationmechanism.
We used a case-based comparative analysis to assess eﬀectiveness: improved
market access for members, strengthened organisational capacities and the
capacity to pay organisational costs. We showed that the grants to already
well-endowed organisations were particularly unsuccessful.
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Innovation grants help to reduce the risk faced by innovators when starting a new business
process (Kessler 2013). Grant systems speciﬁcally targeted to economic farmer organisations
are part of agricultural innovation policies in several countries (Berdegué 2001; Toro and
Espinosa 2003). Evidence on the eﬀectiveness of this type of grant systems on local economic
development is still scarce. Several factors explain this relative neglect of impact evaluation
(Ton et al. 2015). First, attributing outcomes to grants alone is challenging, as the business
plans emerge from a complex process of decision-making in which the grant covers only (part
of) the investments needed, while organisational capabilities or marketing strategies are
shaped by other actors and factors. At most, it is possible to assess if the grant is a nonredun-
dant contributory factor within this causal conﬁguration (Ton, Vellema, and de Ruyter de Wildt
2011; Mackie 1965; Stern et al. 2012). Second, the economic beneﬁts of grant-funded invest-
ments often materialise only after some years of starting-up and gradual market penetration.
Generally, impact evaluations can measure only the changes in short-term outcomes, not on
outcomes that only materialise long after the support period. Third, even when changes in key
outcomes can be measured, the scale and activities of farmer groups vary a lot. This diversity
results in a large variance in performance indicators, such as turnover, membership and
patrimony. This implies the need for large samples to detect statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects
(McKenzie 2012), whereas the limited number of relevant actors that exists in a country or
region may function as a hard cap on sample size. Together, this constraints experimental or
quasi-experimental designs to measure the impact of grants on economic farmer organisations.
Alternative ways to make use of smaller datasets are needed to verify the assumption that
these funds generate development impact (Ton 2015a).
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Contribution analysis has been developed by John Mayne to design monitoring and evaluation
systems for complex interventions where experimental and quasi-experimental designs are impossible
(Mayne 2001, 2011, 2012). Despite substantial attention to contribution analysis in the ﬁeld of evalua-
tion methodology, few studies have applied it in practice (Dybdal, Bohni Nielsen, and Lemire 2010). We
used this approach to assess the relevance, eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of an innovation fund in Bolivia,
Fondo para el Desarrollo de Organizaciones Economómicas Campesinas (FONDOECAS), directed to
economic farmer organisations that develop value-added activities and collectively market their
products. Our research is, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst academic paper in which contribution analysis
is used to assess the eﬀectiveness of a real-world agricultural support intervention.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we discuss the intervention logic and theory of change of
FONDOECAS and select three key assumptions on which we focus the research: relevance of the
farmer groups for local economic development, eﬀectiveness of the fund in strengthening these
group, and eﬃciency of the grant allocation mechanism. Second, we present the research methods
used to verify each of these causal links. The design includes time-series data collection, in-depth
qualitative interviews used for process-tracing and a novel method, qualitative comparative
analysis (Ragin 2008, 2009), to explore for (combinations of) starting conditions that predict success
or failure of the grant. Third, we use the results to develop an evidence-based contribution story for
the FONDOECAS grant fund, and ﬁnish with a reﬂection on the methodology used.
2. Contribution analysis
We used contribution analysis (Befani and Mayne 2014; Mayne 2001, 2011, 2012) as our approach
to impact evaluation. Contribution analysis is a form of theory-driven evaluation intended to verify
and build the intervention’s ‘contribution story’, a narrative of how an intervention contributes to
development. Mayne’s principal motivation to develop contribution analysis was to ﬁnd a systema-
tic way to collect and use monitoring information to reﬂect on the relevance and eﬀectiveness of
policy interventions, even when it is impossible to attribute the societal outcomes unambiguously
to these policy interventions (Mayne 2012). Contribution analysis checks multiple causal links along
the intervention logic through a combination of research questions. The monitoring and evaluation
system needs to ‘build a compelling case with evidence from which it is reasonable to conclude with
conﬁdence that the intervention has made a contribution and why’ (Mayne 2012). Contribution
analysis consists in a six-step process to strengthen the evidence-base of the contribution story.
These steps (see Box 1) describe an iterative process of building and reﬁning the intervention
logic. It identiﬁes the key assumptions of impact that need to be veriﬁed and bolstered, gathers
evidence to verify these, and reﬂects on the results. It is an exercise in which deductive and
inductive research paradigms meet, and three essentially diﬀerent types of research are combined:
theory generating, theory testing and theory modifying (Rohlﬁnger 2012). The mix of methods may
include surveys for net-eﬀect estimates on outcomes that are directly inﬂuenced by the interven-
tion, while using monitoring data, expert panels or other information sources to reﬂect on the
contribution to outcomes that are outside the span of direct inﬂuence (Ton 2012).
2.1. Step 1: set out the cause–eﬀect issue to be addressed
We started with deﬁning the boundaries of the research. The grant fund wanted credible data on
its performance in order to be scaled up or replicated as an eﬀective institutional arrangement to
empower economic farmer organisations in markets. The theory of change was implicit in proposal
to funders (Condori 2005; Ton 2005). The originators elaborated on its additionality to other grant
systems that were functioning or had functioned before. For example, Bolivia had piloted a grant
fund called LIL/INDÍGENA (LIL stands for ‘Learning and Innovation Loans’) with World Bank funds
between 2001 and 2005. An evaluation of the project showed that village organisations had been
successful in generating interest and ideas for economic initiatives, but also that the groups that
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emerged from these processes often lacked the capacities needed to implement and manage the
projects. Economic farmer organisations, formally constituted as associations, proved better suited
to handle these business plans, especially organisations that had existed for some years (Llorenti
et al. 2005). The evaluation of LIL/INDÍGENA also highlighted that organisations which submitted
proposals to the fund experienced long administrative delays (usually several years), which resulted
in several business opportunities no longer existing at the time the grants were ﬁnally approved.
CIOEC and AOPEB’s knowledge on the trajectories of the applicants could prevent investments in
organisations that only existed in name, which were reactivated only when soliciting external
support but had no real economic life of their own. In earlier grant funds, the selection of ‘real’
organisations with ‘sound’ business plans had been a recurring challenge (Hartwich, Alexaki, and
Baptista 2007; Ton 2007). FONDOECAS hoped to develop a grant allocation system that could be
replicated within other agricultural development programmes (FONDOECAS 2010). We identiﬁed
three interlinked key assumptions that guided our research design, and we labelled them in
Figure 1 as ‘relevance’, ‘eﬃciency’ and ‘eﬀectiveness’.
● Relevance – the ﬁrst assumption related to the expected impact on local economic development
of the supported collective marketing groups – the development impact in the intervention logic.
● Eﬃciency – the second assumption was that the lean system of grant allocation would be
eﬃcient in selecting feasible business proposals to viable organisations. The feasibility analysis
Box 1. Key steps in contribution analysis.
Step 1. Set out the cause–eﬀect issue to be addressed
● Acknowledge the causal problem for the intervention in question
● Scope the problem: determine the speciﬁc causal question being addressed; determine the level of conﬁdence
needed in answering the question
● Explore the nature and extent of the contribution expected from the intervention
● Determine the other key factors that might inﬂuence the realisation of the results
● Assess the plausibility of the expected contribution given the intervention size and reach.
Step 2. Develop the postulated theory of change and risks to it, including other inﬂuencing factors
● From intervention documents, interviews and relevant prior research, develop the postulated theory of change of
the intervention, including identifying the assumptions and risks for the causal links in the theory of change
● Identify the roles other key inﬂuencing factors may play in the theory of change
● Determine how contested the postulated theory of change is to better understand the strength of evidence
needed.
Step 3. Gather the existing evidence on the theory of change
● Gather the evidence that exists from previous measurement, past evaluations and relevant research to assess the
likelihood: (1) of the expected results, assumptions and risk being realised; (2) of each of the causal links in the
results chain occurring; and (3) of the other inﬂuencing factors making a signiﬁcant diﬀerence.
Step 4. Assemble and assess the contribution claim, and challenges to it
● Set out the contribution ‘story’ on the likelihood that the intervention ‘worked’: the causal claim based on the
analysis of logic and evidence so far.
● Assess the strengths and weaknesses in the postulated theory of change in light of the available evidence, and the
relevance of the other inﬂuencing factors – which links seem
reasonable and which look weak and need more evidence
● If needed, reﬁne or update the theory of change.
Step 5. Gather new evidence from the implementation of the intervention
● With a focus on the identiﬁed weaknesses, gather data on the theory of change results that occurred, the
assumptions and risks associated with the causal links and the other identiﬁed
inﬂuencing factors
Step 6. Revise and strengthen the contribution story
● Build a more credible contribution claim based on the new data gathered
● Reassess its strengths and weaknesses, that is, the extent to which the results, assumptions/risks and other
inﬂuencing factors occurred
● Conclude on the strength of the theory of change and the role played by other inﬂuencing factors, and hence on
the contribution claim
● If the evidence is still weak, revisit Step 5.
Source: Befani and Mayne (2014, 20). Reproduced with permission of the authors.
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by the technical committee of experts was seen as the key institutional arrangement to
eﬃciently target the grants.
● Eﬀectiveness – the third assumption was that the grants would result in investments that
facilitated business plans that would have a positive impact on the group’s organisational
capacities, market access of members, and the ability to pay for the costs of collective action.
2.2. Step 2: develop the intervention logic and identify the key assumptions
We started by reﬂecting with the involved stakeholders (CIOEC, AOPEB, donors) on the impact
pathway implicit in the rationale of the grant fund, in order to focus the evaluation questions. The
intervention chart in Figure 1 shows the intervention logic. FONDOECAS impact pathway is
relatively straightforward. The main activities of FONDOECAS are the channelling of funds to
feasible business plans. The grants need to help farmer groups to seize business opportunities.
The grants are targeted to organisations with speciﬁc quality attributes. In the case of FONDOECAS,
these quality attributes are codiﬁed in the formal eligibility requirements: a legal status; a docu-
mented participatory consultation process having approved the business proposal; annual ﬁnancial
statements for the last two years; and being aﬃliated to one of the two national representative
organisations CIOEC or AOPEB. The proposal needed to provide information to assess the feasibility
of the business plan: raw materials and complementary processing equipment must be available,
the group must show a credible marketing strategy, the break-even point needs to be reached in a
time span within which the organisation is able to pay for the start-up costs, beneﬁciaries need to
coﬁnance the investment as a guarantee of their commitment, and the organisational structure
should be such that the business operations could be handled eﬀectively. A technical committee
assessed the feasibility of the submitted business plans by reviewing these supporting factors.
Figure 1 depicts the grant-supported business plans as ‘immediate outcomes’, the technical and
economic feasibility as ‘supporting factors’, the changed business practices as ‘intermediate out-
comes’ and the changes in business performance as ‘ultimate outcomes’. By generating or
expanding activities to process agricultural products, both income and organizational capabilities
were expected to be enhanced. Together, these would make it possible to improve service delivery
and contribute to local economic development.
Figure 1. FONDOECAS’ intervention logic.
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2.3. Step 3: gather the existing evidence on the intervention logic
Before designing the data collection methods to verify the key assumptions in the intervention
logic, we reviewed the existing evidence-base.
2.3.1. Relevance
The key assumption of relevance is that local economic development beneﬁts from economic farmer
organisations that have better service provisioning to their members. To understand the (contested)
relevance of FONDOECAS, it is important to consider the rural political constellation in Bolivia at the
time that the impact evaluation was designed. Between 2008 and 2011, a ﬁerce political-ideological
debate started on the role of economic farmer organisations versus traditional village organisations.
Economic farmer organisations were regarded by some as ‘neoliberal’ and threatening the cohesion
of (preferred) communal organisations. The Morales government had introduced several preferential
policies, like municipal cofunding of local business initiatives, accessible only to the traditional village
organisations (sindicatos, ayllus) and not to economic farmer organisations with a more selective
membership (Ton, Gouet, and Gonzalez 2013; Antequera Guerra 2013).
The academic literature is largely supportive to the assumption that independent economic
farmer organisations are important for local economic development and intrinsically diﬀerent than
the traditional village organisations in rural areas in Bolivia. For example, Bernard, De Janvry, and
Sadoulet (2010) show that the inﬂuence of village organisations negatively aﬀects the performance
of economic groups. This is in line with Woolcock (1998) who argues that the homogeneity and
‘closure’ characterising ethnic communities may at some point stiﬂe members’ personal and
business development. Many development programmes in Bolivia emphasise that farmers organi-
sations need to be independent in their economic activities from the traditional village organisa-
tions in order to survive competition (Swen and Both 1999; Healy 2001; Flores et al. 2007;
Bebbington 1996; Llorenti et al. 2005; Toornstra 2000). Others emphasise that close coordination
with these traditional village organisations is necessary to constrain processes of social diﬀerentia-
tion in rural villages (Muñoz et al. 2005; Laguna, Cáceres, and Carimentrand 2006; Laguna 2011).
2.3.2. Eﬃciency
Evidence on the targeting eﬃciency of grant systems is scarce. Unlike in the case of microﬁnancing
institutions (http:\\www.themix.org) and impact investors (http:\\iris.thegiin.org) comparable
benchmarking information on grant systems is unavailable. At the start of the research some
internal monitoring information was available. Since FONDOECAS started with pilot projects in
2006, the project coordinator had used an Excel sheet to register and report some basic metrics on
grant allocation and contracting. This information showed that several organisations were still in
the investment phase. In addition, the analysis showed that many organisations that had been
disapproved by the technical committee had resubmitted a proposal in following rounds.
2.3.3. Eﬀectiveness
In Bolivia, several scholars and practitioners have studied economic farmer groups that received
donor support and describe and analyse the process and dynamics of change that this generated
inside these organisations (Bebbington, Quisbert, and Trujillo 1996; Bebbington 1996, 1997, 1998;
Swen and Both 1999; Toornstra 2000; Flores et al. 2007; Ton and Bijman 2006). Generally, these
studies are favourable towards grant support to these organisations. An external evaluation of
FONDOECAS pilot phase (Prudencio 2010) presented anecdotic evidence that the grant contrib-
uted to economic performance and organisational strengthening.
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2.4. Step 4: assemble and assess the contribution claim
2.4.1. Relevance
The conviction of the initiators and funders of FONDOECAS that economic farmer organisations
were better suited for empowering smallholder farmers in markets than the traditional village
organisations was contested in an ideological debate without a credible evidence-base. CIOEC
hoped that the impact evaluation could generate a piece of evidence to convince these opposing
political forces that funding of economic farmer organisations was legitimate and eﬀective to reach
public goals.
2.4.2. Eﬃciency
In comparison to earlier grant funds, better information to assess FONDOECAS expected to have a
much leaner grant-allocation mechanism in order to limit the time between proposal and implemen-
tation of the business plan, while assuring that the grants ended up in feasible business proposals.
FONDOECAS had as it main eligibility requirements for beneﬁciaries that these existed as a legal entity
and had a minimum of two years of collective marketing experience. CIOEC and AOPEB, the two
national apex organisations that managed FONDOECAS, could be expected to have suﬃcient infor-
mation that would prevent grant allocation to organisations with formal existence but without real
activities and organisational life. This was expected to result in better information to assess the
feasibility of the business proposals. It also implied the assumption that the external technical
committee would be able to discern between feasible and unfeasible business plans based on this
information. The combination of a practical protocol to describe the business opportunity and an
external committee to assess this information was considered a key feature of the grant, which could
attract major donors or be replicated in other (public) grant funds.
2.4.3. Eﬀectiveness
The grants were targeted explicitly to new value-added activities complementary to the collective
marketing of unprocessed raw material. Three intermediate outcome areas were expected to result
from this grant support. First, the new business activities would imply new agreements on logistics,
internal transactions and decision-making. Second, the written business plan and the investments
made with the grant would increase the ‘bankability’ of the organisation. This objective was
prominent in the 2010–2103 strategic plan for FONDOECAS (FONDOECAS 2010), which emphasised
the importance of linking the farmer organisations to credit institutions and larger public grant
programmes, such as the Banco de Desarrollo Productivo. Third, the grant could strengthen the
capacity of the organisations to pay the organisational expenses. Collective action needs some
ﬁnancial resources and time investments. The organisations need some cash income to pay their
organisational activities and, when relevant, staﬀ to operate the new economic activity. The
complementary economic activities were expected to generate organisational income even
when, in the initial years, the scale of the processing activities would be small in relation to the
members supply of raw material.
2.5. Step 5: gather new evidence to verify key assumptions
Based on the former analysis, we developed the intervention logic and methodological design of
this research, reported in Ton (2012), to collect evidence to verify the three key assumptions.
2.5.1. Relevance
As a check whether economic farmer organisations were indeed considered by the rural population
themselves as an important instrument for local economic development, we opted for a survey
with Likert scale statements. Data was collected piggybacking on a household survey made by the
consultancy ﬁrm AnálisisReal-Latinoamérica – AR-LAT. The survey could be conducted at low cost,
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as the results could be combined with data from a previous survey on 20 municipalities in 2008, in
view of AR-LAT’s interest in elaborating an atlas on local economic development potential in
Bolivia. AR-LAT had used a peculiar sampling strategy for these surveys (Aramayo 2008). It used
purposively stratiﬁed sampling in three categories of respondents: households units, economic
units and local government units. The economic units were selected in clusters of villages within
the municipality, in areas with good agricultural production conditions, based on information
provided by the local government. Economic farmer organisations are generally active in areas
with higher agricultural potential. The survey resulted in a database of 1945 observations from 39
municipalities (Aramayo 2013). Without necessarily being representative of all producers in the
municipalities, the data permits comparisons between households having a member in an eco-
nomic farmer organisation and households that have not.
2.5.2. Eﬃciency
We focused the data collection in order to assess the eﬃciency of the technical committee to select
business proposals that have a high change of being successful. During the period 2007–2013, a
total of 10 diﬀerent experts had taken part in the committee. Five out of the 10 experts were more
consistently involved in these evaluations, of which three continuously so in the whole period
2007–2013. We could compare these valuations with another dataset, the results of the monitoring
missions of the FONDOECAS M&E staﬀ, who visited 61 organisations during 2011 and 2013 to
check on progress of the business-plan implementation. Most of these organisations were visited
one year after having had their grant approved. The selection of these organisations was not
random. Some organisations were visited because of persistent delays in implementation.
FONDOECAS’ monitoring oﬃcer reported on progress in four areas: organisation, production,
marketing strategy and ﬁnancial investments. Each area was monitored on four proxy-indicators
of progress.
2.5.3. Eﬀectiveness
To assess the eﬀectiveness of FONDOECAS grants, we designed research to monitor changes on
four outcome areas, the intermediate outcomes in the intervention logic, depicted in Figure 1:
organisational strengthening, increased market access for members, improved capacity to pay
organisational expenses and new access to ﬁnancial service providers. In each of these outcome
areas, we registered changes between 2010 and 2013. The proxy-indicators to measure these
changes may well change irrespective of the grant support; organisations will change in time,
irrespectively of receiving a grant. Therefore, it was necessary to have a design that can inform
about the changes that would most likely have taken place without the FONDOECAS grant. Most
impact evaluations use a quasi-experimental design to get information on this ‘counterfactual’. The
evaluation literature propose various quasi-experimental designs (Khandker, Koolwal, and Samad
2009; Bamberger et al. 2004; Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2002), with randomised control trial,
regression discontinuity and matched diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence as the most likely candidates for use
in our research. First, we explored the feasibility of random assignment of grants, a requirement in
a randomised control trial. This proved impossible, as it was considered as seriously compromising
the legitimacy of the fund and negatively aﬀect CIOEC’s image as an inclusive national apex
organisation. As a second option, we explored the possibility of a regression-discontinuity design,
selecting a comparison group based on the evaluation scores of the organisations that submitted
proposals but were not awarded a grant. However, a review of the administrative information on
the 2006–2010 period showed that most of the rejected applications were due to administrative
reasons, not the quality of the business proposal. They never reached the Technical Committee for
the scoring of the feasibility of proposals. Moreover, the few organisations that did get through this
administrative selection and were rejected by the FONDOECAS evaluation committee qualiﬁed in
their second or third attempt, having resolved the issues related to their business plan. Thus, a
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regression discontinuity design using the threshold scores of the evaluation committee proved
impossible.
A panel study, comparing a grant beneﬁciary with a comparison group in a diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence design, seemed a feasible option to generate information for counterfactual thinking.
However, the variance in most performance indicators was very high (see Table 1), which makes
that the registered diﬀerences between treatment and comparison groups would lack statistical
signiﬁcance even when we could measure them in all organisations that existed in Bolivia. Even
when we would include all 200 CIOEC members in our sample, detectable eﬀect-size in group sales
would still lie far above expectations.
Therefore, we refrained from a quasi-experimental design and decided for a smaller sample in
which we applied case-based qualitative comparative analysis (Ragin 2008; Befani and Mayne
2014; Rihoux and Lobe 2009; Byrne and Ragin 2009). In this case-based analysis, each case was
analysed through an approach inspired by process tracing (Beach and Pedersen 2013; Collier
2011; Perri 6 2006; Befani and Stedman-Bryce 2016). We followed 30 beneﬁciary organisations
between 2010 and 2014 in order to ﬁnd traces of a process that would support the assumption
that the grant indeed contributed to organisational strengthening, members’ access to markets
or capacity to pay organisational expenses. To be considered as a success, the grant had to be a
clear INUS-condition (Mackie 1965) – a nonredundant factor in a conﬁguration of factors that
caused these intended outcomes. We also opted to follow a group of 20 unsupported organisa-
tions, also members of CIOEC, to feed counterfactual thinking. However, we soon experienced
problems of ‘contagion’. Several of these unsupported organisations had become grant solicitors
in late 2010 and in early 2011, and three organisations became grant beneﬁciary during the
research period. We also had many cases of ‘attrition’: seven of the unsupported organisations in
the sample did not exist anymore, or had severe internal problems that made it impossible to
collect information. Six of them proved to be nongovernmental organisations or social-oriented
groups, not economic farmer organisations. Coupled with some logistic problems which pre-
vented some organisations to be contacted, we ended up, end 2013, with 26 grant beneﬁciaries
and only ﬁve organisations that, in 2013, had not (yet) received a grant. In this case-based
analysis, we analysed the available information in order to ﬁnd ‘real events’ that show that the
grant-supported business plans had been implemented and generated eﬀects related with the
three outcome areas. Summaries of the case studies are provided as supplemental data. The main
information sources were the two interview reports that had resulted from the semi-structured
interview in 2011 and 2013. Each interview report provides a ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973) of
the status of the economic and social situation of the group, the progress in the implementation
of the grant supported business plan, and the organisational capabilities of the organisation to
contain ten agency dilemmas, challenges inherent to collective marketing (Ton 2010; Ton et al.
2014). Next to this qualitative information, we summarised the information on organisational in a
one-page summary sheet, called ‘organisational radiography’, with two assessment questions.
The ﬁrst question captured the ‘presence’ of each of the agency dilemmas in the practice of the
organisation, and the second the ‘eﬀectiveness of the organisational solution’. We used this
information to derive a quantitative measure (TCC). In the ﬁnal evaluation, both information
Table 1. Eﬀects that could be detected with a large sample of 200 organisations based on variance at baseline.
Indicator Mean Standard deviation Detectable eﬀect size*
Sample size n = 200
Organisational capacities (TCC score) 22 9.0 3.58
Annual group sales US$ 186,135 US$ 300,634 US$ 119,700
– Sales of unprocessed products US$ 278,134 US$ 386,523 US$ 153,890
– Sales of processed products US$ 36,642 US$ 60,381 US$ 24,040
* p < 0.05; statistical power = 0.8.
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sources are used to trace the eﬀects of the grant and assess its success. The diﬀerences in TCC
scores of the same organisation are triangulated with the qualitative information on the real
dynamics and change processes documented in the two in-depth qualitative interview reports,
and the time-series data on sales, membership and group income spending.
Being aware of the subjective and normative element in the ﬁnal assessment of success
and failure of the grant to reach the intended outcomes by the researcher–evaluator, we used
a peer-review process to improve the validity of the judgement. Two researchers, the author
of this paper (GT) and the local researcher (LF), assessed each case independently. These two
relatively independent assessments of the change processes in each of the organisations
were compared and reconciled. Most diﬀerences were due to diﬀerences in access to
information (GT had more detailed knowledge about the time-series data) or substantive
knowledge about the cases (LF had conducted all the interviews and knew more about the
context and process of the changes). Table 2 shows the Cohen’s Kappa scores, as an indicator
of inter-rater agreement. According to the common interpretation of the kappa-score (Landis
and Koch 1977) the inter-rater agreement was ‘moderate’ for the outcomes enhanced market
access and improved organisational capacities, and ‘fair’ for the increased capacity to pay
organisational expenses. The latter low kappa-score was due to initial diﬀerent interpretations
of ‘success’ on this outcome. During reconciliation, it was agreed that the capacity to pay
expenses was evaluated as being increased when the level of sales had increased due to the
grant, even though in most organisations the total amount of expenses or member income
had not changed.
Table 2. Evaluation of the contributionary role of the grant in three outcome areas.
Positive outcome market access
Positive outcome organisational
strengthened
















AAAT 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
ADAPICRUZ 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
AGAYAP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AMAGA 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
AMDESOY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
AOCEMM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
APAM MIZQUE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
APCA . 1 1 . 0 0 . 0 0
APROAMOL 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
APROQUIRC 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
APSU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ARAO 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
ASAFOP 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
ASOCOM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CECAOT 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
CELCCAR 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
CEMUR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
CEPLACH 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
CIAPEC 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
COAINE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
COMART 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
COPROQUINACC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
INCA PALLAY 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
OMCSA 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
ORLIPA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SOPPROQUI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Success rate 6/25 8/26 5/26 10/25 9/25 10/26 3/25 13/26 12/26
Cohen’s kappa 0.48 0.41 0.22
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2.6. Step 6: revise and strengthen the contribution story
2.6.1. Relevance
The survey yielded valuable information to assess the relevance of the support to economic farmer
organisations (Table 3). Our direct question, ‘Do you consider the association/OECA an important
instrument for economic development?’, was answered positively by two-thirds of the respondents.
Surprisingly, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in opinion about this statement between respon-
dents that had and those did not have membership in an economic farmer organisation. Sixty-ﬁve
per cent of the households that are members of an association consider this organisation to be
more supportive to them than the traditional village organisation, the rural syndicate and/or the
ayllu. Most of these members also consider that economic farmer organisations are among the
best-functioning farmer organisations in the area. On the question whether they would recom-
mend their neighbours becoming a member, nonmembers are a bit more negative than the
households with a member in an economic farmer organisation. However, the majority of them
agreed with the statement that they would recommend others to become a member.
When we compare respondents that had an opinion on the commitment of both village
authorities and leaders of farmer associations, we see that, overall, the opinion is slightly more
positive about leadership in economic farmer organisations (p < 0.05, using a paired sample t-test).
The survey data is supportive of the key assumption in the FONDOECAS intervention logic that
farmer organisations are an important component of the social capital in rural areas and are relevant
for local economic development. Interesting, Table 4 shows that only a minority considered the
association as a means to gain access to markets. More prominent was the association’s function in
improving production and accessing outside support. Moreover, they are considered valuable
aspects of social life, with 55 per cent of the responding households that did not participate in an
economic farmer organisation considering them positively in this respect. This shows that even
though their identity as economic farmer organisations (CIOEC-Bolivia 2010a, 2010b) is framed
around their pivotal role in creating access to markets, they are only considered instrumental in
doing so by a minority of the households. Nevertheless, the willingness to engage in some sort of
collective marketing is high, which supports the assumption that grant support to facilitate the
emergence and development of economic farmer organisations is indeed a relevant activity.
2.6.2. Eﬃciency
Overall, the monitoring information in the inspection reports of the FONDOECAS M&E oﬃcer (Table
5) indicated that organisational progress in business plans lagged. The progress indicators for these
organisations showed a similar pattern. The involvement of members as suppliers or operators in
the businesses was far lower than expected, and only sporadically were specialised persons
operating the business. In addition, progress in the area of marketing was less advanced than
expected, especially on the issue of quality certiﬁcation. Progress in ﬁnancial investment and in
production was relatively good, with 72 and 67 per cent, respectively (Table 5).
We could pair 50 of the 61 monitoring observations with the average feasibility score of the
committee, 13 of these were part of our sample of comparative cases studies. The unpaired
observations diﬀered in name or referred to the same organisation having been visited twice.
We used the 50 paired observations to test the correlation between feasibility scores of the
technical committee evaluation and progress reported by FONDOECAS monitoring staﬀ. We tested
with a multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA). The regression model can be written as
Yij ¼ yi1; yi2; yi3; yi4½  ¼ αþ βXi þ εi;
with
yi1 = progress in organisational commitment of organisation i,
yi2 = progress in production and logistics of organisation i,
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yi3 = progress in marketing strategy of organisation i,
yi4 = progress in infrastructural investments of organisation i,
Xi = feasibility score of organisation i,
εi = error term in regression of organisation i,
The model is statistically signiﬁcant (F[4, 50] = 3.11, p = 0.02, Pillai’s trace, p = 0.02, partial eta-
squared = 0.22). The feasibility scores predict the progress of implementation of the grant-
supported business plan fairly well (see Table 6). The partial eta-squared is considered as a large
eﬀect according to Cohen’s rules of thumb (Cohen 1988) in multivariate analysis. Testing the
Pearson correlations between the feasibility score and the monitoring information, we see that
the feasibility score predicts the progress in ﬁnancial investments in the business plan (F[1,
50] = 7.54, p < 0.01), but is negatively related with progress in production and logistics (F[1,
50] = 4.16, p < 0.05). When we revised the data, we detected that the negative correlation was
heavily inﬂuenced by the low scores of two dairy organisations, which had invested the grant in
processing equipment but never managed to get their business operational. These are the only
organisations in the dataset that had received zero points for both progress in production and in
marketing. The negative correlation between high evaluation scores and progress in the area of
Table 5. Monitoring scores on business plan implementation.
All visited (N = 61)
Matched with evaluator
scores (N = 50)
Matched with case














Organisation Increasing involvement of
members
0.16 0.36 0.16 0.36 0.15 0.38
Members know how to
manage production
0.48 0.52 0.48 0.52 0.31 0.48
There is professional staﬀ
available
0.36 0.48 0.4 0.48 0.54 0.52
Business plan beneﬁts all
members
0.56 0.52 0.64 0.48 0.46 0.52
Subtotal 39% 25% 42% 24% 37% 32%
Production Primary production 0.80 0.40 0.84 0.36 0.77 0.44
Procurement from members 0.64 0.48 0.68 0.48 0.85 0.38
Processing of product 0.52 0.52 0.56 0.52 0.77 0.44
Collective marketing of
product
0.92 0.24 0.96 0.2 1.00 0.00
Subtotal 72% 26% 76% 24% 85% 16%
Marketing Finished product 0.68 0.48 0.76 0.44 0.85 0.38
Ready market 0.52 0.52 0.48 0.52 0.69 0.48
Quality certiﬁcation of
product
0.24 0.44 0.28 0.44 0.23 0.44
Dedicated buyer for product 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.38 0.51
Subtotal 48% 24% 50% 21% 54% 20%
Financial Equipment in place 0.88 0.32 0.92 0.32 1.00 0.00
investment Machinery in place 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.69 0.48
Infrastructure in place 0.84 0.36 0.88 0.36 0.69 0.48
Working capital available 0.44 0.52 0.48 0.52 0.46 0.52
Subtotal 67% 29% 69% 27% 71% 22%
Table 6. Multivariate analysis with average feasibility score as predictor of ﬁeld monitoring results (N = 50).
Source Area Pearson correlation F Sig. Partial eta-squared
Feasibility score Organisation 0.049 0.115 0.736 0.002
Production −0.282 4.155 0.047 0.080
Marketing −0.011 0.006 0.939 0.000
Financial investments 0.368 7.539 0.008 0.136
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production disappears when we exclude these two outliers (F[1, 48] = 0.03, p = 0.87). The
monitored progress in ﬁnancial investments realised with the grant remains the only area that
has a statistically signiﬁcant correlation with the committee’s feasibility scores (F[1, 48] = 5.01,
p < 0.05).
These result show that the evaluators’ score on feasibility of the proposed business plan indeed
predicted progress in implementation (ﬁnancial investment). However, there is no positive correla-
tion with the more substantial outcomes in the areas organisation, production and marketing. This
suggests that the committee proved not very eﬃcient at diﬀerentiating between feasible and less
feasible business plans.
2.6.3. Eﬀectiveness
2.6.3.1. Did the grants improve organisational capacities?. To verify the assumption that
grants are eﬀective in improving organisational capabilities, we collected panel data in two rounds,
2011 and 2013. In each round, we conducted in-depth interviews on the dynamics within each
organisation surrounding 10 agency dilemmas that are common in collective marketing arrange-
ments (Ton 2010; Ton, Vellema, and de Ruyter de Wildt 2011; Ton 2015b; Ton et al. 2014). We
summarised this qualitative information in a summary sheet, called an ‘organisational radiography’
(Ton 2015b).
We expected that as a result of the investment in value-added production, in addition to their
current bulking activities, the number of relevant agency dilemmas would increase. To our surprise,
we found a decrease. Whereas in 2011 the grant beneﬁciaries had an average of 7.0 agency
dilemmas, in 2013 this was only 5.8. The average change was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
(paired sample test p = 0.05). However, the interviewed board members indicated that most of
these changes were considered to be unrelated to the grant. They changed as a result of a wide
range of other factors and actors, such as market dynamics, context-speciﬁc political dynamics, or
support from other agencies.
In Table 7, we distil only the organisations that indicated that the change in their capacity to
handle an agency dilemma was indeed related to the grant-supported business plan. Eight
diﬀerent organisations mentioned a grant-related change in one or more agency dilemmas. Five
of these six organisations reported that they had fewer problems with quality assurance (T2). This is
in line with FONDOECAS’ focus on supporting added value through processing, and paying
attention to the niche markets of public-procurement programmes. Processing creates the need
to improve the quality of the products supplied by members and develop rules and regulations
that are eﬀective in doing so.
Other agency dilemmas that changed by the grant-supported activities were the issue of
working capital constraints (T3) by ASPASA, the issue of diﬀerentiating services between members
and nonmembers (T7) by AOCEMM, the issue of distribution of legal responsibilities in contracts
and loans (T9) and the issue of managing political aspirations (T10) by COMART. Two organisations
indicated that the grant had a relation with an area where they experienced more problems.
ADAPICRUZ mentioned that there were more problems with quality assurance due to the imple-
mented business plan. They were in the process of organic certiﬁcation of their honey products
and experienced that the requirements in this market forced them to be more demanding. In
AMAGA, problems around various agency dilemmas had increased between 2011 and 2013, after
their dairy processing plant started to operate.
Apart from the relevance, we assessed the strength of the organisational solution to each
dilemma (Table 8). For each tension, we assessed if the solution resolved the tensions around
the agency dilemma or that the organisation was still trying to ﬁnd a solution. We used the
information on both questions – relevance and strength – to compute a tension containment
capacity (TCC) score. We describe the method in detail in another paper (Ton 2015b).
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Table 8 shows that the average change (ΔTCC) in grant beneﬁciaries is −21 per cent, with a
change of 5.9 points less than the average TCC score of 27.7 in 2011 (p < 0.01). Most organisations
appear weaker in 2013 than in 2011. Acknowledging the limits in accuracy of the TCC construct
(Ton 2015b), we applied a margin of 15 per cent up or down to classify the change between 2011
and 2013 as ‘the same’. Six grant recipients increased their tension containment capacities, six
stayed the same and 14 had a lower score.
2.6.3.2. Did the grants improve access to markets?. The average group sales presented a
tendency of growth in most of the organisations studied. The diﬀerences in growth rate per
organisation vary greatly (see Table 9). The strongest growth of sales occurred in the quinoa
exporters (COPROQUINACC, ASPASA, SOPROQUI, CECAOT and APROQUIRC), especially in the
2011–2012 period, when quinoa prices more than doubled. We see that the strong growth in
the coﬀee cooperatives between 2008 and 2010 period slowed down in the period 2011–2012.
This change is due to the implosion of the international coﬀee price during that period. In
addition, the growth rates of the honey processor ADAPICRUZ levelled out in 2011–2012. Growth
rates were extremely high for AMDESOY, a small soy processing enterprise, more than doubling
their sales each year. However, the absolute value of their sales remained still relatively low.
The average growth rate of total group sales seems a good proxy for commercial health of the
organisations. However, it is a poor indicator for judging the eﬀectiveness of the FONDOECAS













Name of the organisation that
reported a relation with the
grant-supported business plan
T1 – ‘Regulating member
supply’
More problems 4 4 0
No change 4 4 0
Fewer problems 3 1 2 AOCEMM, ARAO
T2 – ‘Quality assurance
systems’
More problems 4 3 1 ADAPICRUZ
No change 13 9 4 COMART, AAAT, ASAFOP, CEMUR
Fewer problems 9 4 5 AOCEMM, ARAO, APROQUIRC,
APROAMOL, CEPLACH
T3 – ‘Coping with
working capital
constraints’
More problems 3 2 1 AMAGA
No change 18 16 2 ARAO, CEPLACH
Fewer problems 4 3 1 ASPASA
T4 – ‘Anticipating side-
selling’
More problems 6 6 0
No change 10 9 1 ADAPICRUZ
Fewer problems 0 0 0
T5 – ‘Ways to use proﬁts’ More problems 3 2 1 AMAGA
No change 15 15 0




More problems 2 1 1 AMAGA
No change 10 8 2 AOCEMM, ADAPICRUZ
Fewer problems 1 1 0
T7 – ‘Decision-making on
activities that beneﬁt
only a subgroup’
More problems 2 1 1 AMAGA
No change 8 4 4 AMLECO, ASAFOP, CIAPEC,
ORLIPA
Fewer problems 2 1 1 AOCEMM
T8 – ‘Task delegation and
supervision of
professional staﬀ’
More problems 4 4 0
No change 14 14 0
Fewer problems 5 5 0
T9 – ‘Liability in contracts
and loans
More problems 1 1 0
No change 10 8 2 ASPASA, ARAO
Fewer problems 1 0 1 COMART
T10 – ‘Managing political
aspirations’
More problems 8 8 0
No change 11 11 0
Fewer problems 2 1 1 COMART
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grants, especially when the grant investments had been directed to new business activities which
were complementary to existing, traditional economic activities. Therefore, in Table 10, we make a
distinction between sales of processed and unprocessed products. We indicate the year and sales
group in which the grant was invested and indicate if the interviewed board members considered
the registered change in these group sales related to the grant investment.
As described earlier, for each case we ‘traced’ the process of change and evaluated if the grant
could be considered a contributory factor to improved market access of members. Market perfor-
mance is inﬂuenced by more factors than FONDOECAS. Therefore, there might be some discre-
pancy between the trend in sales of an organisation and our evaluation of the successfulness of the
grant in improving market access for members. The columns at the right in Table 10 present the
reconciled verdict of the researchers based on data and qualitative information about the change
process in each organisation (see online supplementary material for further details). In six cases, the
‘ﬁnal verdict’ diﬀered markedly from the tendency of growth and the self-assessed contribution of
the grant to this growth. On these organisations, the two researchers coincided that the grant
could not be considered as a contributory factor. For example, the three coﬀee organisations
registered an increase in sales of processed products (roasted coﬀee). However, the amount of
coﬀee used in this processing was negligible when compared with the amount of coﬀee sourced
from their members for export. And, in two of them (COAINE and CIAPEC) the equipment bought
with the FONDOECAS grant was in fact never used in processing for external clients. Furthermore,
Table 9. Registered group sales in the period 2008–2012.
Annual group sales (US$)
Average yearly
growth rate (%)
Sector Name 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Benef. Comp.
Agriculture ASOPROF –a –a –a 1,000,000 1,700,000 70
OMCSA –a 2500 2971 3800 1500 1
FENCA –a –a 142,857 142,857 0 −50
Cattle AGAYAP 0 0 0 17,423 14,286 −18
APCA –a –a 45,714 51,429 41,429 −3
ORLIPA 0 2286 3071 5857 10,214 66
Coﬀee CELCCAR 285,714 285,714 372,143 443,571 501,429 16
CIAPEC 400,000 600,000 802,857 1,302,857 1,331,428 37
COAINE 608,000 714,143 1,409,571 1,388,571 1,116,857 23
Dairy AMAGA 3214 3143 4600 3551 4371 11
AMLECO –a –a 339,000 355,714 367,143 4
CEPLACH 11,429 11,429 11,429 10,000 4286 −18
Handicrafts AAAT 28,571 42,857 64,324 61,830 45,792 18
APSU –a –a 18,571 18,571 8857 −26
ARAO 60,532 71,420 83,322 88,923 97,793 13
COMART 214,286 228,571 207,143 192,857 171,429 −5
INCA PALLAY 69,202 82,262 72,748 89,034 97,309 10
Honey ADAPICRUZ 36,286 114,857 145,429 197,714 205,714 71
AOCEMM 47,143 45,181 31,991 45,994 55,015 8
APAM MIZQUE 10,257 11,643 8786 17,357 20,857 27
APME –a 30,649 34,987 37,653 45,050 14
APROAMOL 0 0 2934 2649 2220 −13
Processed foods AMDESOY –a 1102 3749 4412 10,286 130
ASAFOP 47,143 51,429 0 28,571 38,571 −19
CEMUR 171,429 114,286 142,857 204,224 217,448 10
Stone mining ASOCOM 185,714 167,143 204,286 214,286 242,857 8
Quinoa APROQUIRC 457,143 514,286 571,429 720,000 1,300,000 33
ASPASA 0 0 100,000 200,000 500,000 125
CECAOT 142,857 178,571 172,000 186,286 795,714 89
COPROQUINACC 128,571 135,714 200,000 205,714 457,217 45
SOPPROQUI 600,000 500,000 571,429 1,400,000 1,600,714 39
Average annual growth rate 21 33
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three organisations active in food processing bought their inputs from nonmembers in the local
market. They gained market access as micro-enterprises, but did not create market access for their
members. Only for ﬁve grant recipients did the grant indeed improve market access for members
(APCA, ARAO, ADAPICRUZ, AOCEMM and APROQUIRC).
Our explorative analysis to ﬁnd predictors of success of failure of the grant using fuzzy-set
qualitative comparative analysis (Ton 2015c) showed that successful outcomes – organisations in
which the grant was considered a contributory factor to increased market access of members –
were found only among organisations that sourced their raw material from members. The analysis
showed also that, small organisations proved more likely to be unsuccessful. In addition, the old,
large and strong organisations that already had high organisational capacities when awarded the
grant proved particularly unsuccessful. The interview reports pointed to a causal mechanism that
could explain this pattern in the data. In many of these organisations, the grant had been used for
complementary processing, a secondary economic activity alongside their primary activities in
bulking and exports (for example, quinoa, coﬀee). All these organisations indicated the limited
amount of the grant (USD 10,000) as a reason for the failure of the business plan. The grant had
resulted in underscaled investments; the supported business activities could not get the produc-
tion volume needed for a commercially viable market launch.
2.6.3.3. Did the grants increase the capacity to pay organisational expenses?. The evalua-
tions were more positive considering the grant’s contribution to the capacity to pay organisational
expenses, like oﬃce supplies, expenses related with communication and travel, or personnel.
Annual organisational expenses are modest, with an average of US$ 2411 (S.E. US$ 448) in 2012.
ARAO, a handicraft organisation, registered the highest amount with US$ 8962, because they need
to rent shop space. On average, payments to hired staﬀ were 46 per cent (S.E. 6%) of total
organisational costs. Small nonsourcing microenterprises that sell processed food (AMDESOY,
ASAFOP, CEPLACH) had lower costs because members do most of the work.
Table 10 shows that for 12 organisations the grant contributed to an increased ability to pay
organisational costs, representing 41 per cent of the grant recipients. Almost two-thirds of the
implemented business plans were successful in generating group income. The explorative analysis
of predictors of success and failure, using qualitative comparative analysis (Ton 2015c), shows that
especially the organisations that sourced their raw material form members were unsuccessful in
generating group income. Nonsourcing organisations have the advantage that they can use all
beneﬁts to pay organisational costs and salaries and do not have to negotiate the collective
interests of the group with the short term interest of the members in a higher price of the raw
material that is sourced from them. When the increased capacity to pay organisational expenses
would be the main objective of the fund, targeting the grants to nonsourcing organisations would
likely improve the eﬀectiveness of the fund. In addition, the grant had proven particularly
unsuccessful for the larger and stronger organisations that already had high organisational capa-
cities and a large scale of operations at the moment of receiving the FONDOECAS grant. Income
generated with the new activities only represented a small percentage of total income available to
pay organisational expenses.
Table 11. Implementation and outcomes of grant supported business plans.
Number of organisations Success rate (%)
Beneﬁciaries 29 100
Grant implementers in 2012 23 79
Business plans in operation in 2012 19 66
Grants contributed to organisational capacities 10 35
Grants contributed to market access of members 5 17
Grants increased capacity to pay organisational expenses 12 41
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3. Discussion
3.1. FONDOECAS’ contribution story
FONDOECAS emerged as a pilot-project to address the speciﬁc problems of economic farmer
organisations in collective marketing, in view of scaling up and replication. The fund provided
grants (around US$ 10,000) to business plans that were evaluated on feasibility by a committee of
external experts. The donor community supported FONDOECAS because they consider stronger
economic farmer organisations as relevant actors for local economic development. This relevance
legitimates the use of public money to support them. To make these groups stronger, the grant
fund needs to have a mechanism to select the best business proposals. And, these grants need to
be eﬀective in strengthening the groups’ organisational and economic performance. We used
contribution analysis to reﬂect on these assumptions.
The research shows that the implementation rate of grant-supported business plans in the
sample is 66 per cent (see Table 11). One third of the grants were not properly invested in
necessary technology or infrastructure. FONDOECAS improved organisational capacities in 10 of
the 29 organisations. Half of the implemented business plans resulted in an improved capacity to
manage collective marketing, foremost being the capacity to resolve the issue of quality assurance.
Although we cannot compare this with the outcomes of other grant funds, and a certain percen-
tage of failure is inherent to innovative business plans, FONDOECAS has certainly been less
eﬀective than was initially expected by its initiators. The results on the capacity to generate income
to pay organisational expenses were relatively good. Almost two-thirds of the implemented
business plans were successful in generating group income, representing 41 per cent of the
grant recipients. This is even more evident for the objective to increase market access for member
products. Only 17 per cent of the grants were successful in this respect. Nevertheless, most
economic farmer organisations registered a high growth of group sales between 2008 and 2013.
Overall, they have become commercially stronger, especially due to higher agricultural prices and
preferential procurement by public nutrition programmes. However, the contribution of
FONDOECAS to this growth is modest.
Support to economic farmer organisations is, nevertheless, relevant, even when innovation
grants are clearly not the panacea. The household survey showed that there is majority support
for economic farmer organisations among the rural population. Households that were participating
in economic farmer organisations considered them even more supportive than the village organi-
sations. Interestingly, their role in creating market access is reported as being the least evident
beneﬁt. There was more agreement on the statement that they are a means to support production,
access outside support, and as a component of social life. There are, however, prospects for growth,
considering the willingness of two-thirds of the farmers to market their products collectively.
The research to verify the assumption of eﬃciency in selecting the more feasible business
proposals suggests that the technical committee has not been very eﬃcient. Although we showed
a positive correlation between feasibility scores and progress in implementation of investments,
there seems no predictive power for progress in the organisation, production and marketing
related aspects of the business plan. FONDOECAS may have to redesign the grant allocation
mechanism in order to improve eﬃciency. Some steps have been taken to do so. In 2012,
FONDOECAS reduced the number of member in the technical committee from ﬁve to three but
retained the most critical external reviewers. In 2013, FONDOECAS decided to make grant alloca-
tion conditional on the information in ﬁeld visit report by the M&E oﬃcer to organisations with a
provisionally approved grant proposal. In addition, when based on the available information one
external reviewer scored the feasibility as insuﬃcient (lower than 4.5 on a scale of 10), the average
score was not decisive and he or she had vetoing power. In 2015, CIOEC and AOPEB decided to
intensify the use of their decentralised structures and technical support team to backstop the
implementation of the grant proposal in order to increase the eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of the
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grants. It is, however, too early to evaluate if these changes in grant governance resulted
improvements.
The research shows that grant funds that want to empower smallholder farmers in markets
through collective marketing activities should target their grants, and distinguish between
farmer organisations that source and those that do not source their raw material from members.
Both types respond diﬀerently to investment support in value adding activities. Market access
for members is only possible with sourcing organisations, and larger organisations are more
likely to be successful in using the grant to do so. Instead, organisations that source their raw
material from spot markets are more likely to be successful in using the grant to raise group
income to pay for organisational expenses. The research shows that the grants proved particu-
larly unsuccessful for the larger and stronger organisations that already had high organisational
capacities and a large scale of operations at the moment of receiving the FONDOECAS grant.
Loans not grants may be more appropriate and eﬀective instruments for strengthening these
larger organisations.
3.2. Contribution analysis as framework for impact evaluation
The approach to impact evaluation used in this research, contribution analysis, has wider relevance.
The shift in development cooperation ‘from aid to trade’, with an increasing number of grant funds
directed to companies, comes with an increasing need to verify relevance, eﬀectiveness and
eﬃciency of grants for business development (Kessler 2013). There is a need to reﬂect on the
eﬀectiveness of support interventions that, like FONDOECAS, want to trigger complex change
processes and work in a restricted population of ﬁrms or organisations. Quasi-experimental designs
are often not possible or too vulnerable for unanticipated changes in context or implementation.
However, counterfactual thinking can be supported with other information than data from a
comparison group.
Counterfactual thinking implies a structured and transparent way of discarding alternative
explanations for an eﬀect (Vellema et al. 2013; Yin 2013). This requires reﬂection on the question,
what would have happened without the intervention? In our research, this implied a case-by-case
evaluation of the contributory role of the grant in generating certain outcomes, based on a close
reading of the dynamics within each organisation, looking for ‘traces’ of grant-induced change and
alternative explanations. To do so, we collected time-series data and in-depth qualitative informa-
tion, and evaluated a grant as successful, when the changes in indicators were supported by
qualitative descriptions of the change processes induced by the grant. This process tracing resulted
in a dataset on success or failure of the grant for each of the organisations in the sample.
Qualitative comparative analysis proved useful as exploratory research method to explore for
plausible predictors of success, and resulted in actionable working hypothesis that were used to
guide the redesign of the intervention in order to improve the success rate.
We showed that through a creative mix of methods and data-analytical approaches, using
fund speciﬁc monitoring data, comparative cases studies on beneﬁciaries and surveys, it is
possible to critically review the key assumptions in the rationale behind developing interven-
tions. Contribution analysis, the veriﬁcation and bolstering of the contribution story, helps
implementing agencies to reﬂect on expectations and learn to reﬁne the intervention and
targeting mechanism.
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